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How Central Bankers See It
The First Decade of European 
Central Bank Policy and Beyond
Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
9.1    Introduction
Otmar Issing: “There was a clear view from a number of outside observers 
that we would fail and that it would be a disaster in any respect.”
As late as 1997, less than a year before the European Central Bank (ECB) 
was scheduled to come into existence, there was widespread skepticism about 
whether the European Monetary Union (EMU) would begin on schedule 
as a broad union and, in some quarters, whether it would happen at all. 
Yet here we are a full decade after the advent of EMU and today there are 
ﬁ  fteen countries where the euro is legal tender. The twenty-  one members 
of the Governing Council of the ECB make monetary policy for a region 
of 320 million people with a gross domestic product (GDP) of roughly €9 
trillion. And it is hard to ﬁ  nd major fault with what they have done over the 
past decade.
In this chapter, we begin with a brief history of the challenges that faced 
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the people who forged the policies of the ECB in its ﬁ  rst decade. What tests 
did these central bank pioneers face as the European Monetary Institute was 
transformed into the ECB on 1 June 1998? With hindsight, it is fair to say 
that the preparations were a success in nearly every way. The ECB was able to 
conduct monetary policy operations immediately without a major misstep. 
The original Governing Council’s interest rate decisions were sound, over-
coming a lack of data and models that would have panicked most people. 
While communication at the start may not have been as smooth as some 
people wished, it improved over time. Looking back, nearly every possible 
contingency that the ECB actually faced was anticipated and successfully 
addressed, reﬂ  ecting careful preparation and unusual foresight.
Our task does not stop at recounting the past. Looking forward, we go 
on to ask what the likely challenges are for the next decade. The ECB is an 
evolving institution that is changing in unique ways. The euro area contin-
ues to expand. Enlargement could bring ten additional members into the 
monetary union over time—and more if the European Union itself grows. 
Each of these countries has its own language, cultural traditions, and social 
norms. Adding them to the euro system aﬀects decision making and com-
munication, as well as policy itself.
Beyond increasing its size, the ECB faces challenges in retaining public 
support for its own policies and in promoting the structural reforms needed 
to increase the ﬂ  exibility of member economies. Regional economic diver-
gences within a country may create problems, but they are unlikely to be as 
severe as the political diﬃculties that the ECB is likely to face should the 
economies of the various countries in the euro area experience dramatically 
diﬀerent economic fortunes for extended periods. Furthermore, as we look 
forward, prosperity in Europe does not depend on monetary policy alone. 
The decisions by member governments have an important impact on what 
the ECB can and cannot achieve.
Finally, there is the question of ﬁ  nancial stability. Here, the ECB posi-
tion as a pan-  euro area ﬁ  nancial institution is unique. While the Governing 
Council has clear control over the combined balance sheet of the central 
banks in the euro system (those of the National Central Banks plus that of 
the ECB itself), it does not have regulatory or supervisory authority. And 
unlike the United Kingdom, where regulation and supervision resides in a 
single institution, ﬁ  nancial oversight in the euro area is at the national level 
and each country is diﬀerent.
In drafting this history, we have beneﬁ  ted from many studies that analyzed 
ECB policy, from its rate- setting patterns to its eﬀectiveness in securing price 
and economic stability to its communication eﬀorts. The ECB itself has been 
an excellent source, reﬂ  ecting its admirable penchant for self-  assessment.1 
1. The Monetary Policy of the ECB, ﬁ  rst published in 2001 and revised in 2004, as well as 
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But there is no shortage of outside reviews and critiques.2 Furthermore, we 
now have nearly a decade of data with which to characterize the economic 
outcomes of ECB policy.
However, our unique advantage arises from a series of seventeen extended 
interviews conducted between June 2007 and February 2008 with a range 
of current and former ECB policymakers, and with other policymakers 
and scholars who viewed the evolution of the ECB from privileged vantage 
points outside the institution. The questionnaire that we employed as a basis 
for the interviews forms appendix A of this chapter. Appendix B reports the 
prominent themes in response to these questions. Abbreviated biographies 
of the interviewees are in appendix C.
The ground rules for our interviews were straightforward: we asked each 
interviewee to review and correct an edited transcript of the interview, add-
ing or deleting anything they wished. While we have used their responses 
to inform our judgment and understanding, all direct quotes in either the 
main text or the footnotes have been approved by the interviewees. We are 
very grateful for their generous support, especially considering that our 
interviews were conducted during the ﬁ  nancial crisis that began in August 
2007.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. This introduction is 
followed by a brief discussion of the initial conditions in 1998 and the chal-
lenges that participants expected as the monetary union was getting under 
way. In section 9.3, we move to a more detailed discussion of the construc-
tion of the ECB’s operational framework, including the creation of the euro 
area money market as well as the initial implementation of the policy and 
communication strategies. We then proceed to an evaluation of ECB policy 
performance in the ﬁ  rst decade of monetary union in section 9.4. We pro-
vide a brief discussion of the euro area inﬂ  ation experience, as well as the 
stresses and strains created by various aspects of the policy strategy. Section 
9.5 looks to the future. Here, we report on the key challenges that our inter-
viewees foresee over the second decade of EMU. Enlargement and ﬁ  nancial 
stability are the issues that are clearly on people’s minds, so that is where we 
focus most of our attention. Section 9.6 concludes.
While we base nearly everything that we write on the series of interviews 
we conducted, the narrative that follows (including any errors or faulty judg-
ments) is our own. We include extensive quotes in the form of footnotes to 
provide a sense of why we have drawn the conclusions that we have.
2. A list would start with the Monitoring the European Central Bank series published by the 
Center for Economic Policy Research in London, and include analysis from the Observatorio 
del Banco Central Europeo in Madrid as well as the Center for European Policy Studies in 
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9.2    Initial  Conditions
Jean-  Claude Trichet: “The main challenge we saw was to transfer to the 
new currency what had been promised: namely, that it would be as conﬁ  -
dence inspiring, as credible, and as good a store of value as the previous 
national currencies had been.”
The European Central Bank (ECB) came into existence on June 1, 1998—
replacing its predecessor, the European Monetary Institute (EMI). At the 
start of 1999, the ECB took over monetary control in the initial eleven 
countries of the euro area.
The ECB was a new and unprecedented institution without a track record, 
but it was not born in a vacuum. The treaty of Maastricht provided for its 
independence from governments and established a hierarchical mandate for 
ECB policy with price stability as the top priority.3 Because any alteration of 
the treaty requires unanimous support of the member states of the European 
Union, this mandate remains widely perceived as immutable. While the ECB 
began with only a few hundred employees, it drafted a signiﬁ  cant portion of 
its staﬀ from national central banks (NCBs) which, together with the ECB, 
form the euro system.
Nevertheless, the policy tests facing the ECB at its inception were numer-
ous and daunting. Section I, part a, of appendix B identiﬁ  es the most promi-
nent concerns that our interviewees perceived when the ECB began. From 
this list, it is evident that the ECB faced an extraordinary challenge as it 
sought to inherit from the start the credibility of its most successful pre-
decessor central banks.4 There also were great risks, as there would be no 
honeymoon or grace period. Any signiﬁ  cant rise of inﬂ  ation expectations or 
of inﬂ  ation risk premia in the run-  up to EMU might have branded policy a 
failure even before the ECB began to exercise monetary control.
By day one, the new central bank needed to promote the development of 
a euro area-  wide money market in which it could operate. The euro system 
needed to determine which matters would be centralized within the ECB, 
and which would be delegated to the NCBs for execution or oversight. There 
was concern whether the powerful NCB governors— and their large staﬀs—
  would overwhelm the ECB, and potentially undermine the euro area focus 
of the new central bank.5 While the EMI had narrowed the options for the 
3. The treaty allows the region’s ﬁ  nance ministers to negotiate an international agreement 
(such as a ﬁ  xed-  exchange rate regime) that could theoretically override ECB monetary inde-
pendence. So far, however, there has been no such proposal, let alone indications of consensus 
among ﬁ  nance ministers to alter the ﬂ  oating-  rate regime.
4. Axel Weber: “The biggest challenge for the newly-  founded euro system—operating with-
out a track record—was to gain credibility in ﬁ  nancial markets and among the citizens of 
Europe.”
5. Six members of the ECB Executive Board would join eleven NCB Governors in the initial 
Governing Council. While exaggerated by the inclusion of NCB operational personnel, the 
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policy strategy, the ECB had only seven months in 1998 to consider speciﬁ  c 
alternatives (principally inﬂ  ation or monetary targeting), to specify the strat-
egy in detail (including the operational methodology), and to prepare the 
apparatus for making decisions and communicating. In doing so, it lacked 
the timely data and reliable models of the euro area that modern central 
bankers rely on in making policy rate decisions. Moreover, the structural 
changes induced by the creation of the euro—which favored a rapidly inte-
grating ﬁ  nancial market and economy—meant fundamental uncertainty 
about the monetary transmission mechanism. In a virtually unique manner, 
at the start the ECB had to manage a currency that did not exist in notes 
or coin.
Also, the ECB was to begin operations in an environment of overt skep-
ticism.6 Some observers anticipated currency disturbances reminiscent of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crises even after the start of EMU 
(see, e.g., Garber 1999).7 Prior to EMU, it was common among prominent 
economists to conclude that the euro area’s lack of labor mobility and of 
a mechanism for ﬁ  scal burden-  sharing made it a suboptimal currency area 
that would be prone to country-  level divergences in activity, employment, 
and ﬁ  scal balances (see Feldstein [1997] or Obstfeld [1998]).
Against this background, the broad membership of EMU—which in-
cluded several formerly high- inﬂ  ation countries—raised doubts about cred-
ibility: would the euro area yield curve be an amalgam of EMU member 
yield curves, or would it mimic those with the most favorable inﬂ  ation track 
records (such as Germany, Benelux, and France)? The former outcome 
might even have prompted speculation about secession from EMU, however 
diﬃcult. Similarly, would cross-  country yield spreads be so wide as to cast 
doubt on EMU’s sustainability?
Finally, it was unclear at the outset to what extent monetary union would 
promote European political union, or even whether ﬁ  scal and supply-  side 
reforms could keep pace with monetary and ﬁ  nancial integration. The 
EMU’s most extreme critics viewed it as a political device to secure bureau-
cratic mastery over Western Europe, rather than as a means of promoting 
euro area welfare.8
end-  2007, ECB employment had trebled from its end-  1998 level of 450, but was still only a 
fraction of NCB staﬀ.
6. Andrew Crockett: “A few years before the start most observers would not have believed 
you if you’d told them there would be twelve members, or at least eleven and soon twelve, at 
the beginning of monetary union.”
7. Vitor Gaspar: “People worried about the possibility of turbulence in the foreign exchange 
markets.”
8. See, for example, Connolly (1995). With regard to the ECB, Connolly writes: “But if the 
ECB is ever created, it will certainly not act in a disinterested way in the interest of the Commu-
nity as a whole, simply because there is no such thing as the Community interest. Either it will 
act in French interests or it will not. If it does, then Germany will destroy it, putting an end to 
ﬁ  fty years of a ‘European Germany.’ If it does not, then it might well destroy France” (391).332        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
9.3    An  Operational  Framework
Otmar Issing: “What really shocked me [when I arrived] was the lack 
of any reasonable information (data, etc). We were preparing monetary 
policy for totally uncharted waters.”
Alexandre Lamfalussy: “I feared that they would have technical problems 
of all kinds. Ultimately, I was wrong. The implementation went extraor-
dinarily smoothly.”
Vitor Gaspar: “An explicit strategy was clearly necessary to ensure the 
internal cohesion of the decision-  making bodies of the ECB. It also was 
necessary to have a consistent framework which would enable the bank 
to communicate to a very diverse set of constituencies.”
In light of these initial conditions, how would the ECB secure the goal of 
price stability and the subsidiary goals established by the treaty?
9.3.1      A Single Money Market
No ECB policy using interest rates as a tool could be implemented ef-
fectively without the existence of a deep, eﬃcient euro area money market. 
Such a market did not exist before EMU. From a technical perspective, the 
euro system introduced a real-  time gross settlement system, TARGET, as 
the foundation for a single market for overnight liquidity at the start of the 
ECB. The system had to be fully functional by January 4, 1999 when the ECB 
conducted its ﬁ  rst open- market operation.9 Interviewees who were involved 
in these preparations recalled concern about the lack of time for testing and 
worries that any operational failure would signiﬁ  cantly damage the reputa-
tion of the ECB and the single currency even before it got going. There was 
at least one brief occasion in the spring of 1999 when money markets seemed 
slow to react to policy developments, but TARGET has been viewed as an 
extraordinary achievement, bringing about a near-  instant integration of 
the national markets for overnight liquidity. Further evolution of TARGET 
over the years (including the November 2007 introduction of TARGET II) 
built eﬀectively on this success.
In contrast, several interviewees viewed the public reaction to the 2002 
introduction of euro notes and coin as the ECB’s greatest self-  made disap-
pointment in its ﬁ  rst decade. From a technical perspective, this enormous 
logistical process went more quickly and smoothly than many had expected. 
Most of the legacy currency was replaced within a matter of weeks rather 
than months, and there were no notable disruptions of retail activity. Oﬃcial 
9. Christian Noyer: “The greatest concern was to be sure to start operations eﬀectively on 
the 4th of January 1999. If we wanted to have a single money market functioning in euros, we 
needed absolutely to have the TARGET system working to enable banks to exchange liquidity 
and the central bank to intervene. We needed the system working from the start to enable us 
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estimates indicate that the changeover boosted the price level on average by 
0.12 percent to 0.29 percent (Eurostat 2003).10 However, as the ECB subse-
quently observed, this modest one- oﬀ price adjustment prompted an unan-
ticipated (albeit temporary) rise of inﬂ  ation expectations in some countries 
that may have contributed to doubts about EMU in the public mind. (Vari-
ous explanations of this phenomenon may be found in the essays collected 
in Del Giovane and Sabbatini [2008] as well as in Dzuida and Mastrobuoni 
[2007]). Some policymakers still wonder whether a more aggressive com-
munication eﬀort would have anticipated and blunted these doubts.11
9.3.2    Objectives  and  Strategy
Prior to the start of operations, the ECB stated a quantitative deﬁ  nition 
of price stability: inﬂ  ation of less than 2 percent as measured by the Harmo-
nized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Some outside observers criticized 
this goal as asymmetric (in contrast with the inﬂ  ation level or bandwidth 
objectives commonly used by inﬂ  ation-  targeting central banks). Concerns 
about goal asymmetry appeared particularly acute amid the deﬂ  ation scare 
earlier in this decade. In 2003, following a broad policy review, the ECB 
clariﬁ  ed its numerical objective, but did not alter it substantively—it was 
restated as “less than, but close to 2 percent.” Since that time, the ECB’s 
announced goal has not changed, and objections to its asymmetry have 
waned. In part, that may reﬂ  ect the judgment of some observers that the 
actual target is roughly symmetric around 2 percent (see Galí et al. 2004). 
The ECB’s response to the record 2008 overshoot of its target appears con-
sistent with that view.
In October 1998, the ECB announced the “two-  pillar” strategic frame-
work that included a focus on monetary developments (Pillar I) and on all 
other factors aﬀecting the economic and inﬂ  ation outlook (Pillar II). The 
oﬃcial policy review in 2003 left these two pillars in place, but described the 
approach in a more eclectic (and less mechanical) fashion that focused on 
the use of the monetary pillar as a “cross-  checking” device in which mon-
etary analysis utilizes a broad array of ﬁ  nancial variables. Galí et al. (2004) 
characterized the 2003 shift as a deemphasis of M3 growth that made clear 
that “money growth is not an alternative policy target” (18).
There is a voluminous literature studying this unique framework, which 
would seem to be neither ﬁ  sh (inﬂ  ation targeting) nor fowl (monetary target-
ing). Much of the analysis from outside the ECB has criticized the monetary 
10. Popular claims that oﬃcial measures understate the price impact of the changeover have 
not been supported by subsequent analysis (see Del Giovane and Sabbatini 2008).
11. According to Eurobarometer 58 (2003), 77 percent of euro area respondents judged that 
prices had been “rounded up” during the conversion to the euro. Ignazio Angeloni: “None of 
us thought at the beginning that a key problem would come from the introduction of the euro 
bank notes and coins (rather than from the 1999 introduction of the euro). . . . Speciﬁ  cally, I 
refer to the impact of the introduction of the euro on retail prices and to the eﬀect on expected 
inﬂ  ation and perceived inﬂ  ation in particular.”334        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
pillar as superﬂ  uous in securing price stability under a ﬂ  exible inﬂ  ation-
 targeting framework; Svensson (2000) quipped that the ﬁ  rst pillar was really 
just a brick in the second pillar. One early study argued that the negative cor-
relation between monetary signals and policy rates in some periods conﬁ  rms 
that the ECB “ignores the monetary pillar” (see Begg et al. 2002, 20). A later 
analysis expressed doubt that policy decisions would have been any diﬀerent 
had been there no “explicit role for money” (see Galí et al. 2004, 59).
In contrast, ECB analysis has focused on establishing the importance 
of monetary developments for price stability over a horizon longer than 
that of most economic forecasts. The ECB oﬃcials, such as Issing (2003), 
also have suggested that monetary developments can help policymakers 
anticipate threats to price stability from asset price bubbles. Nevertheless, 
ECB policymakers have been obliged to account for sustained overshoots of 
monetary aggregates beyond reference values that have not appeared linked 
to price developments. This pattern has tended to downgrade the perceived 
policy importance of such overshoots and has reinforced doubts about the 
monetary pillar on the part of many skeptics. It remains distinctly possible 
that the modest signal-  to-  noise ratio of monetary developments eventually 
could erode the credibility of a central bank that emphasizes its reliance on 
information from monetary analysis.
However one may view the lingering debate about the two pillars, as 
Issing (2006b) emphasizes, critics underestimate the historical utility of the 
hybrid strategy in securing for the ECB from its inception the credibility 
of its most eﬀective predecessor, the Bundesbank. Failure to do so at the 
start could have been extremely costly, if not irretrievable. By its nature, the 
ECB must communicate to a more diverse public than virtually any central 
bank. Even in the distant future, the diﬀerences in languages, traditions, 
institutions, and legal systems across EMU members are unlikely to disap-
pear. In Germany—which represented one- third of EMU economic activity 
at the start—the association of low inﬂ  ation with Bundesbank monetary 
targeting in the public mind probably warranted an ECB emphasis on euro 
area monetary developments as a means to anchor inﬂ  ation expectations. 
Achieving this desired continuity required a consistency of objectives and 
communication mechanisms suited to the unique historical circumstances. 
Looking forward, it remains to be seen whether the ECB’s low-  inﬂ  ation 
reputation will spur it over time to simplify the policy strategy while keeping 
inﬂ  ation expectations well-  anchored.12
9.3.3    Communications
Otmar Issing: “Translation was, of course, linguistically always very good, 
but the same words and phrases may seem diﬀerent against the back-
12. For example, Papademos (2006) describes how the two pillars eventually could merge 
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ground of diﬀerent historical experiences. For example, one colleague 
once said to me, ‘Otmar, we have a paragraph containing three times a 
reference to price stability. I think this is too much for this argument. In 
my country, if you say three times why you seek price stability, it weakens 
your argument.’ And my argument was, if in Germany it’s only two times, 
they say, ‘Oh, is the ECB less stability oriented than the Bundesbank?’”
In the course of linking its communication strategy with its objectives and 
instruments, the ECB developed innovative mechanisms for communication 
to compensate for constraints that diﬀerentiate it from other large central 
banks. Like most modern central banks, the ECB views transparency both as 
a goal in itself—necessary for accountability in a democratic society—and 
as a means to make its policies more eﬀective.13 It is now a commonplace that 
central bank policy is transmitted to the economy through forward- looking 
ﬁ  nancial markets, so that clear objectives, a systematic approach to analysis 
and decisions, and timely public statements are indispensable.
Yet the ECB has also been keen to shield individual members of the Gov-
erning Council from pressures to pursue national, rather than euro area, 
policy goals. The concern, which appeared particularly acute at the start 
of EMU but remains notable today, is that domestic politics could make 
Council members less inclined to support policies that would be in the best 
interests of the euro area, but not necessarily optimal for their home coun-
tries. For this reason, the ECB eschews the publication of minutes that would 
detail Council members’ statements or votes.14 The ECB’s alternative—the 
immediate post-  meeting press conference held by its President—narrows 
the information loss due to the lack of detailed minutes, while accelerating 
the diﬀusion of the consensus judgment.15
As with other major central banks, ECB communications is a work in pro-
gress characterized by a trend toward greater transparency. Some intervie-
wees noted that, in the early years, failure to synchronize public statements 
by Governing Council members occasionally contributed to confusion.16 
Jansen and de Haan (2004) show that NCB Presidents “made at least as 
many statements” in the early years as the Executive Board, but also indi-
13. Lucas Papademos: “What matters for the eﬀectiveness of communication is to explain 
as clearly as possible the decisions taken and the policy being implemented in relation to the 
central bank’s objective and strategy. It is essential to explain how the monetary policy stance 
contributes to the achievement of the objective. The more transparent and convincing a cen-
tral bank is about the consistency of its actions with its objective and strategy, the greater the 
eﬀectiveness of its policy.” See also European Central Bank (2006b).
14. Fabrizio Saccomanni: “[P]ublication of minutes would be taken in Europe as an excuse 
to speculate about national preferences regarding monetary policy. We have to be careful not 
to create unnecessary problems of sensitivity at the national level.”
15. Sirkka Hämäläinen: “From the very beginning, I have seen the press conference as the 
best way to communicate.”
16. Sirkka Hämäläinen: “Communication and public statements of the members of the 
Governing Council (the Board members included) were not initially always fully synchronized 
and thus monetary policy messages sent to markets were somewhat confusing.”336        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
cate that the frequency of contradictions in statements about interest rates 
declined over time. The observed decline in the implied volatility of options 
on short-  term futures also suggests that ECB communication with markets 
has become more eﬀective (see ECB 2006a).
Other changes also reﬂ  ect the maturing of the institution (including its 
data set and models): for example, the ECB began to publish its semian-
nual staﬀ economic forecasts in December 2000, subjecting internal views 
to wide external scrutiny. More broadly, the ECB has developed an active 
dialogue with the public regarding its practices and their evolution. The ECB 
seminars, conferences, and oﬃcial participation in outside programs like the 
ECB Watchers’ Conference promote an exchange of ideas with academi-
cians, market practitioners, and others. In the oﬃcial sector, the ECB also 
pursues active communication through frequent parliamentary testimony 
and routine contact with the Eurogroup, Economic and Financial Aﬀairs 
Council (ECOFIN), and the European Commission.17
At least one recent study by Eijﬃnger, Geraats, and van der Cruijsen 
(2006) compares the level of ECB transparency favorably with that of other 
central banks.18 Our own judgment, which coincides with the consensus of 
interviewees, is that there is no single “best practice” with regard to trans-
parency and communication.19 Communication is about language and ges-
ture, both of which depend on tradition and history. Eﬀective signaling 
under constraints requires a thorough understanding of how the signals 
will be received (which may diﬀer across languages and cultures) and also 
about which signals could distort the incentives of policymakers and thereby 
undermine the beneﬁ  ts of transparency. In the words of John Taylor, “More 
talk does not mean more transparency.” At the same time, the ECB’s ten-
dency to describe its decisions as unanimous may understate the nature and 
vigor of important Governing Council debates, thereby diminishing the abil-
ity of observers to make an informed judgment about policy and sustaining 
skepticism about ECB communications more generally.
A key question that arises frequently today is whether central banks 
should announce an expected path of future policy rates. Ultimately, to 
maximize the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, the signals and means of 
signaling need to be consistent with a central bank’s objectives and strategy. 
17. Jean-  Claude Trichet: “I have to explain regularly and tirelessly all over Europe that I am 
as frequently in Brussels with the European Parliament as Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan 
appears and appeared before Congress, perhaps even a little bit more frequently. . . . I invited 
twice a month the President of the college of Ministers of Finance (the Eurogroup) to attend 
the Governing Council meeting of the ECB. . . . I am, myself, invited every month to attend 
the meetings of the Ministers of the euro area. Three times a month, there is physical contact 
between the ECB’s Governing Council and the executive branches and the Commission.”
18. However, public perceptions of ECB transparency may be less favorable: see Eijﬃnger 
and van der Cruijsen (2007).
19. Philipp Hildebrand: “The notion that you could somehow hold up the Norwegian model 
or the Swedish model or the Swiss model as the right model for the ECB strikes me as slightly 
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Such announcements systematically reinforce policy goals through rapid 
market adjustments. At the same time, excessive concreteness that surpasses 
the ability of policymakers to reliably anticipate future developments can be 
counterproductive. For these reasons, it is far from clear that publication of 
an expected future policy rate would be optimal for all central banks (which 
have diﬀerent objectives and constraints) or on all occasions for a particular 
central bank (which may face periods of heightened uncertainty).20
The same judgment could be applied to the use of “code words” to signal 
policy intentions. Codes are imperfect signals at best, and typically relate 
only to near- term policy prospects, which may be of least importance in the 
formulation of critical long- run market expectations. Rather, these expecta-
tions depend sensitively on the transparency and reliability of the central 
bank’s reaction function, along with an understanding of the evolution of 
prices and the economy.
The role of signaling in the monetary transmission mechanism highlights 
how important it is for central banks to understand markets and their policy 
responses. Central bankers know that any slavish response to market expec-
tations runs the risk of creating price level or inﬂ  ation indeterminacy. At the 
same time, equilibrium in markets requires that the expectations of market 
participants and central bank decision makers coincide. Consequently, to 
make their policies most eﬀective, central banks need to understand how 
markets behave and how to aﬀect expectations without diminishing market 
incentives for price discovery.
In the case of the ECB, we suspect that the lack of direct ﬁ  nancial market 
experience on the part of most Governing Council members may have com-
plicated this task. The ﬁ  rst decade record is ﬁ  lled with outside complaints 
about ECB communication with ﬁ  nancial markets. Much of this criticism 
underestimates the political constraints under which a multinational organ-
ization such as the ECB functions and the challenge of communicating with 
so many diverse constituencies. Nevertheless, a greater presence of senior 
ECB leaders with ﬁ  nancial market (rather than central bank) experience 
might have sped the evolution of the central bank’s communications.
9.3.4      Data, Models, and Policy Analysis
Over the ﬁ  rst decade of EMU, the ECB has made enormous strides in 
developing data for and models of the euro area economy, as well as advanc-
ing the frontiers of policy analysis. In the early years of EMU, the lack of 
consistent, timely euro area-  wide data added sharply to policy uncertainty 
about the current state of the economy. Even near the end of 2000, for 
example, published euro area output gap estimates of oﬃcial institutions 
20. For a view calling on the ECB to announce an explicit rate path, see Geraats, Giavazzi, 
and Wyplosz (2008). For a counterargument from a member of the Governing Council, see 
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diﬀered by nearly 1 percentage point, with the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) ﬁ  gure standing at –  0.3 percent, 
while the European Commission published an estimate of –  1.2 percent. 
Moreover, recent readings show very large revisions to these “real-  time” 
estimates—the current OECD measure of the euro area output gap in 2000 
is 1.2 percent, while the Commission’s is 1.9 percent.21 The structural 
changes induced by EMU added to uncertainty, while the lack of models 
for the economy as a whole sharply limited the ability of policymakers to 
be forward-  looking.
Perhaps as compensation, the decision-  making process at the ECB allo-
cated until recently a signiﬁ  cant role to the Chief Economist in setting the 
stage for policy rate decisions. The likely eﬀect was to enhance attention to 
the limited supply of timely aggregate data relative to the abundant supply 
of anecdotes in policy making, helping to narrow the grounds for policy 
debate. As a result, the “proposal power” inside the Governing Council may 
have been of greatest importance in the early years of EMU, precisely when 
the shortage of data and forecast models was most acute.
Today, there are still important gaps in the availability of timely euro area 
data, although progress depends largely on advances outside the ECB.22 At 
the same time, the ECB has developed a forecasting apparatus that is state-
  of-  the-  art in the central banking world and—as previously mentioned—
routinely publishes its staﬀ projections. In addition, the broad research pro-
gram of the ECB has reached a status that puts it at the frontier of applied 
policy analysis alongside the best research eﬀorts of other leading central 
banks and academic institutions.
9.3.5      Euro System—A Constitutional Pact
The Maastricht treaty’s map for the governance of the ECB and the euro 
system is a complex one. How can the region’s central bankers actually make 
decisions and divide labor? From the point of view of monetary policy, a 
key question was whether policy determination would be truly euro area 
oriented, or if it would reﬂ  ect some ambiguous compromise arising from 
the pursuit of national interests? With ﬁ  fteen NCB governors and six Execu-
tive Board members serving on the initial Governing Council, it is natural 
21. For comparison, the average of the output gaps in the year 2000 reported in the IMF 
World Economic Outlook of October 2000 (2007) for France, Germany and Italy was –  1.2 
percent (1.4 percent).
22. For example, employment data are available in the United States within days of each 
reporting month, but only seventy-  ﬁ  ve days after the end of a reporting quarter in the euro 
area. Similarly, GDP data with breakdowns are available in the euro area at t  65 days, 
compared to t  31 days in the United States. And, in some euro area countries, harmonized 
index of consumer prices (HICP) ﬂ  ash estimates only recently became available. It is up to the 
national statistical agencies and Eurostat to change this, not the ECB. For a discussion of plans 
for improvement, see the report of the Economic and Financial Committee (2007) that was 
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to wonder whether community interests might have been overwhelmed by 
national ones. At least one study examined (and rejected) the hypothesis 
that median voting of Council members sensitive to their domestic inﬂ  a-
tion conditions accounted for policy patterns in the ECB’s early years (see 
Alesina et al. 2001).
Our interviews revealed unanimity among ECB insiders that country-
 speciﬁ  c factors were irrelevant in the policy rate-  setting process even at the 
start of EMU. Having feared a greater role for national interests, some inter-
viewees reported reacting with surprise and satisfaction at that time.23 Others 
suggested that the long process of preparing for EMU—including joint 
preparatory work at the EMI—had fostered a broad consensus among euro 
area central bankers about the objectives and implementation of monetary 
policy that underpinned the ECB’s behavior.24
Interviewees also indicated that operational matters resulted in less will-
ingness to don a “euro area hat.” For example, eﬀorts to streamline the 
euro system—which would aﬀect the locus of some operations and employ-
ment—were more likely to inspire national concerns. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, in 2007 the euro system had ﬁ  fteen local mints accredited for produc-
tion of euro notes, compared to only two mints in the United States.25
Nevertheless, the euro system has successfully addressed many critical 
questions requiring a judgment about how to divide labor between the ECB 
and the NCBs. Monetary policy operations are at the top of this list. Policy 
is set by the ECB and implemented by the NCBs with their local counterpar-
ties using contractual arrangements based on national laws. The ECB lays 
down the guidelines for open market operations—such as the single list of 
collateral acceptable for repo—and instructs the NCBs about the size of 
operations, but the NCBs conduct the operation. Unlike the U.S. Federal 
Reserve system, there is no single locus (such as New York) for open market 
operations. Operations coordinated in this decentralized manner require so-
phisticated information and communication technology that did not exist 
in the early history of the Federal Reserve.26
23. Hans Tietmeyer: “[The decision-  making process] was smoother than I anticipated, 
because I thought that the diﬀerent traditions and structures of the national central banks 
could play a diverging role, and that at least some governors could be tempted to feel themselves 
primarily as representatives of a national area. But especially at the governors’ level, there was 
a relatively broad-  based common feeling from the beginning.”
24. Sirkka Hämäläinen “To me, it was quite clear that after those many years of working 
together it was natural to expect it to be very smooth.”
25. For a discussion of euro note printing, see European Central Bank (2007a). It is worth 
mentioning that some Federal Reserve District Banks, despite their eighty- four- year historical 
advantage over the euro system, sustain branch operations that may no longer serve a clear 
economic purpose.
26. Christian Noyer: “We have a center, but the operations are made in the national central 
banks. We don’t need to concentrate actions geographically (in contrast to the U.S. example in 
New York) because we have been born in a time of highly sophisticated telecommunication net-
works and computer systems, so it’s easy to do that without concentrating the operations.”340        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
9.4      The First Decade of Performance
Axel Weber: “I think the success is the high degree to which price stability 
has been achieved. . . . Long- term inﬂ  ation expectations have been stable 
and low and anchored at the level deﬁ  ned as price stability.”
Hans Tietmeyer: “From the beginning, the ECB was seen inside and out-
side the euro area as independent and credible.”
Fabrizio Saccomanni: “The euro is now considered to be an important 
currency with a global role.”
Timothy Geithner: “[S]ince the ECB has been setting monetary policy, 
it has not produced a sustained period of subpar growth; the euro area 
has not experienced greater volatility of economic growth; and there has 
certainly not been any erosion of inﬂ  ation performance. These may not 
be the only measures of central bank credibility, but they suggest that the 
ECB is performing well.”
A review of the euro area outcomes in the ﬁ  rst decade of the ECB yields 
a positive appraisal of ECB monetary policy, particularly in light of the 
extraordinary initial conditions from which policy evolved.
9.4.1    Inﬂ  ation Record
The inﬂ  ation record is straightforward. Over the period since 2001 (as-
suming that ECB policy typically aﬀects prices with a lag of about two 
years), HICP inﬂ  ation has averaged 2.3 percent, modestly above the ECB’s 
oﬃcial target of “less than, but close to 2 percent.” During that period, 
headline inﬂ  ation ranged from a trough of 1.6 percent in 2004 to a recent 
peak of 3.7 percent amid a record oil price shock. For comparison, in the 
pre-  EMU period 1991 to 1998, headline inﬂ  ation averaged 2.6 percent and 
ranged from 0.8 percent to 5.0 percent.27 Even in Germany, which boasts the 
preeminent pre-  EMU inﬂ  ation track record, inﬂ  ation has been lower and 
far more stable in EMU: under the Bundesbank, German inﬂ  ation averaged 
3.4 percent from 1965 to 1998 (with a standard deviation of 3.4 percent), 
while German inﬂ  ation since 2001 has averaged 1.8 percent (with a standard 
deviation of only 0.6 percent).
The stability of euro area inﬂ  ation can be seen in the broad decline of 
its rolling standard deviation during the ECB years (see ﬁ  gure 9.1). Other 
nominal variables, such as GDP, display a similar pattern. This remarkable 
steadiness is consistent with the evidence of reduced inﬂ  ation persistence in 
many countries, including the largest euro area members (see Cecchetti et al. 
27. Euro area core inﬂ  ation as measured by the HICP excluding energy and raw food averaged 
1.8 percent from 2001 to 2007, remaining within the 1 percent to 2 percent range in seventy- one 
of eighty-  six months. By contrast, from 1991 to 1998, core inﬂ  ation averaged 2.9 percent and 
was in the 1 percent to 2 percent range only twenty-  eight out of ninety-  six months.The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 4 1
2008). Yet this phenomenon should not be attributed primarily to external 
factors. Indeed, the treaty’s mandate and ECB commitments likely helped to 
embed this stability in long-  term inﬂ  ation expectations at an early stage.
Even prior to EMU, long-  term government bond yields had converged 
to levels consistent with low euro area-  wide inﬂ  ation, rather than to some 
weighted average of the yields of the high and low inﬂ  ation countries (see 
ﬁ  gure 9.2). By the start of EMU, the euro area yield curve also appeared 
consistent with that of the yield curves of the lowest- inﬂ  ation countries (see 
ﬁ  gure 9.3).
This profound market conﬁ  dence also is evident in the stability of inﬂ  a-
tion survey data, which has been anchored very close to the ECB’s objectives. 
For example, the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters’ mean projection 
of long- term inﬂ  ation has been stuck, with the exception of a single quarter, 
in a tiny 1.8 percent to 2.0 percent range since the survey began in 1999.28 
Even the oil price shock of 2007 to 2008 so far has failed to dislodge these 
expectations, while surveys of long- term inﬂ  ation expectations in the United 
States have crept to the highest levels in more than a decade.
In light of the trying economic circumstances of the past decade, the 
28. Andrew Crockett: “In some respects, the credibility of the ECB could be said to be even 
greater than that of the Federal Reserve. Inﬂ  ationary expectations in the United States are 
further away from the so-  called comfort zone of the Fed than European inﬂ  ationary expecta-
tions are away from the ECB’s target.”
Fig. 9.1    Five-  year moving standard deviation of annual HICP inﬂ  ation, 
1976– 2007
Sources: European Central Bank, Eurostat, and authors’ calculations.Fig. 9.2    Ten-  year government yields, January 1990–  March 2008
Source: Ecowin.
Fig. 9.3    Slope of selected yield curves (ten-  year minus two-  year govt. yields), Jan-
uary 1990–  March 2008
Sources: Ecowin and authors’ calculations.The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 4 3
achievement of low and stable inﬂ  ation in the euro area most likely reﬂ  ects 
good monetary policy, not good fortune. Several factors make this assess-
ment compelling. First, since its inception, the euro area experienced large 
(and occasionally record) price shocks from developments in energy, com-
modity, and currency markets—not unlike the Great Inﬂ  ation episode. Sec-
ond, the economy’s persistent rigidities resulted in a low level of potential 
growth.29 Third, the loss of country- level monetary independence eliminated 
a potential remedy for idiosyncratic shocks. Fourth, rather than beneﬁ  ting 
from ﬁ  scal reforms, the region exhibited ﬁ  scal fatigue (partly reﬂ  ected in 
the relaxation of the euro area’s ﬁ  scal compact—the Stability and Growth 
Pact, or SGP). Finally, the ECB endured repeated interventions by various 
regional politicians that might have weakened the credibility of a central 
bank less ardently committed to independence and price stability.30
Some outside observers have criticized the ECB for exceeding its inﬂ  a-
tion objective, and for not resetting its objective in line with actual practice 
on the occasion of the 2003 policy review (see Galí et al. 2004). During the 
deﬂ  ation scare, others suggested that the target was set too low to allow 
for eﬃcient cyclical and competitive adjustments in some regions without 
favoring a disruptive decline of prices and wages (see European Economic 
Advisory Group 2003). Our own judgment is that while the lingering asym-
metry of the ECB’s objective may not be optimal, in the absence of any 
credible deﬂ  ation threat it is unimportant. It seems fair to conclude that 
the ECB has been very successful—at least until 2008—in keeping inﬂ  ation 
stably close to its goal over the ﬁ  rst decade. Considering the uncertainties 
and doubts that preceded the ECB’s existence, EMU skeptics must view 
this achievement as stunning. More important, low nominal bond yields 
and reasonably stable wage-  setting in the face of record commodity price 
shocks conﬁ  rm that capital and labor markets have conﬁ  dence in the ECB’s 
low- inﬂ  ation commitment.
9.4.2      Dividends of Price Stability
Consistent with the Great Moderation literature, Cecchetti et al. (2008) 
note that the stabilization of euro area inﬂ  ation has been associated with 
a continued low level of output volatility compared to the Great Inﬂ  ation 
29. The following comment of Hans Tietmeyer is representative of views expressed by the 
majority of our interviewees: “My real disappointment relates to the domestic policies of 
some national governments, especially regarding inappropriate ﬁ  scal reforms and not creating 
appropriate conditions for more dynamic and ﬂ  exible markets.”
30. On this point, our interviewees were unanimous: on no occasion did the ECB alter policy 
as a result of strains with European politicians. Lucas Papademos: “My colleagues and I are 
very attached to the principle of central bank independence. Appropriate monetary policy 
decisions are best taken within an institutional framework that eﬀectively safeguards this in-
dependence. Attempts by political leaders to inﬂ  uence ECB decisions will either have no eﬀect 
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period (see ﬁ  gure 9.4). As just mentioned, the plethora of shocks that hit 
the euro area economy in this period appears to undermine claims that this 
outcome is merely a result of good fortune. The largest shocks include the 
bursting of the global equity bubble, global recession, terrorist attacks, war 
in Iraq, a deﬂ  ation scare that triggered unusually low global policy rates, and 
large currency swings. Yet the low level of euro area GDP volatility compares 
favorably even with the widely acknowledged U.S. example (see ﬁ  gure 9.5). 
Under the ERM regime of the early 1990s, large changes in the value of the 
U.S. dollar had occasionally created stresses across European bond markets 
and cross- exchange rates that added to output volatility. The single currency 
regime appears to have counteracted such stresses. We agree with Cecchetti, 
Flores-  Lagunes, and Krause (2006) that improved policy under the ECB 
shifted the euro area to a better trade- oﬀ between the variability of inﬂ  ation 
and the variability of output.
By securing price stability, ECB policy contributed indirectly to many 
other advances in euro area welfare. One example is the progress in capi-
tal markets and the ﬁ  nancial system. Government bond markets appear to 
have been largely integrated at a very early stage in EMU. Legal and other 
obstacles still inhibit the integration of some markets, especially for corpo-
rate equities. However, the rapid expansion of markets for corporate bonds 
and for many derivative instruments over the past decade partly reﬂ  ected 
the stable euro area economic environment. The breadth and depth of 
Fig. 9.4    Five-  year moving standard deviation of real GDP, 1976–  2007
Source: European Central Bank and authors’ calculations.The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 4 5
these markets facilitate the eﬃcient allocation of savings in the region. The 
gradual evolution toward banking integration also contributes to regional 
eﬃciency.
9.4.3      Monetary Pillar: Did It Matter?
One issue that may aﬀect future policy strategy is the performance of 
the monetary pillar in the ﬁ  rst decade.31 Compared to the 4.5 percent refer-
ence value for M3 growth set at the start of EMU, M3 growth averaged 7.4 
percent since 2000 and exceeded the reference value in eighty-  eight out of 
ninety- seven months (see ﬁ  gure 9.6). Because the overshoot did not prevent 
the ECB from achieving a high degree of price stability, one may safely con-
clude that it did not prompt the ECB to become overly restrictive.
From this pattern, it is clear that the ECB’s use of its monetary pillar has 
been far from mechanical. The ECB policymakers, notably Issing (2004) and 
Stark (2006), have emphasized that the prominent role of money in their 
strategy aims at underscoring policy’s “medium-  term orientation,” while 
taking account of the potential links between money and credit growth and 
asset price bubbles. The ECB staﬀ research (Fischer et al. 2006) discusses 
31. Alexandre Lamfalussy’s comment is representative of the views inside the ECB in the 
early days: “I have always been in favor of the two-  pillar approach in terms of strategy. I use 
economic analysis and then cross check it by examining the monetary aggregates.”
Fig. 9.5    Real GDP volatility—ratio of euro area to United States, 1976–  2007
Sources: European Central Bank, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations.346        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
the complex and evolving analysis that the central bank devotes to monetary 
developments as a “cross check” for other inﬂ  ation indicators.
However, the complexity of the procedure—which involves the estimation 
of underlying trends in monetary aggregates adjusted for portfolio shifts—
likely makes any policy response to monetary developments less predictable. 
Without adjustments to the aggregates, money-  based forecasts typically 
overpredicted inﬂ  ation, while the adjustments may be large and occur with 
some time lag. In turn, market uncertainty about the ECB’s response may 
reduce the eﬀectiveness of policy, because ECB behavior is less likely to be 
reinforced by market anticipations. For example, Andersson, Hansen, and 
Sebestyén (2006) found euro area bond markets to be insensitive to news 
about M3 announcements. To the extent that the ECB actually responded to 
monetary news, the response appears to have been received in the euro area 
bond market as an unanticipated policy disturbance, despite the prominent 
role of the monetary pillar. In this sense, the pillar has yet to be deﬁ  ned in 
an operational manner that elicits market understanding.
9.4.4    Currency  Considerations
The performance of the ECB cannot be divorced from the role of the new 
currency, which instantly became the world’s second-  most important store 
of value and means of payment and has continued to rise in importance 
since inception.
Fig. 9.6    Annual growth of M3 (three-  month centered moving average), 1999–  2007
Source: European Central Bank.The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 4 7
The ﬂ  uctuations of the foreign exchange value of the euro during its ﬁ  rst 
decade of life are surely relevant for future policy strategy. Prior to EMU, 
some observers expected that the reduced importance of the currency for 
euro area-  wide activity would downgrade its impact on policy, hinting 
that currency volatility versus the dollar would rise compared to, say, the 
Deutsche Mark. In fact, there is little direct evidence of increased volatility 
(see ﬁ  gure 9.7). Taking January 1999 as a base of 100, movements in the real 
euro/  dollar exchange rate have been large, ranging from an index trough of 
83 in 2008 to a peak of 139 in 2001, but the order of magnitude of these 
swings does not appear out of line with patterns in some earlier periods (see 
ﬁ  gure 9.8).
Broadly speaking, the ECB in its ﬁ  rst decade has been as inclined to inter-
vene directly in currency markets as the Federal Reserve (or U.S. Treasury); 
which is to say, not very.32 From an operational and international coordina-
tion perspective, our interviewees highlighted the ﬂ  exibility that the ECB 
demonstrated in joint operations to support the euro in its early years. Yet 
direct market intervention was rare: multilateral intervention occurred only 
once (on September 22, 2000), when there was a clear sense that the euro was 
undervalued. While unilateral intervention may have taken place on other 
Fig. 9.7    Three-  month moving standard deviation of euro/  US$ and DM/  US$ 
exchange rates, January 1975–  March 2008
Sources: ECB, Federal Reserve, and authors’ calculations.
32. See Bini-  Smaghi (2007) for a discussion of euro system intervention policy.348        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
occasions, we are aware of only one instance (on November 3, 2000) that 
was reported in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. Verbal intervention was more 
frequent, but one study viewed early statements by ECB oﬃcials as merely 
adding to currency volatility, with little persistent impact on the exchange 
rate (see Jansen and de Haan 2003). In recent years, ECB oﬃcials occasion-
ally have jawboned in an attempt to slow the euro’s rise, but have not capped 
the climb. In real, trade- weighted terms against a broad range of currencies, 
the euro has appreciated by about 5 percent from its start in 1999 and by 28 
percent from its trough in November 2000.
9.4.5      Disappointments: Outside the ECB
The most frequently expressed disappointments about the euro area in its 
ﬁ  rst decade have nothing to do with ECB monetary policy per se: namely, 
the lack of structural and ﬁ  scal reforms and the lack of concomitant pro-
gress toward political union.33 Many of our interviewees contrasted the 
European Union’s ambitious Lisbon Agenda with the scattered, desultory 
character of actual supply-  side reforms and the frequency of backsliding. 
Fig.  9.8  Inﬂ  ation-  adjusted euro/  US$ and DM/  US$ exchange rates (January 1999 
 100), 1970–  February 2008
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank, European Central Bank, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and authors’ calculations.
33. An indicative quote comes from our interview with Edward George: “[T]he problem is 
not the functioning of monetary union in a narrow sense, but the performance of the wider 
economy given the lack of political consensus that I think you need for successful economic 
management.”The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 4 9
Some expressed concern that the region’s low potential growth would lead 
observers to blame the ECB because of the need for policy to tighten even at 
early stages of recovery. Judgments about ﬁ  scal policy have been less nega-
tive than pre-  EMU skeptics feared, but the lack of consolidation in some 
high-  debt countries remains notable, especially amid renewed divergence 
between several national economies (see ﬁ  gure 9.9). The relaxation of the 
SGP and the decentralization of the region’s ﬁ  scal arrangements only add to 
doubts about coordination and the prospects for future consolidation.
In contrast to what many EMU advocates anticipated, there is little doubt 
that progress toward political union has not kept pace with monetary union.34 
From the ECB’s perspective, this pattern complicates eﬀorts to secure broad 
popular support. In a democratic society, public backing is critical to ensure 
the independence of a central bank over the long term. While the Maastricht 
treaty provides the ECB with a very strong foundation, the ECB lacks the 
natural constituency that the most credible national central banks typically 
enjoy, especially when confronted by politicians with a shorter horizon. The 
ECB’s eﬀorts to communicate help to build that popular support, but this 
Fig. 9.9    Selected EMU members: Changes in current account balances (share of 
GDP) and unit labor costs (percent), 2007 vs. 1998
Source: EU Commission Ameco database.
34. Axel Weber: “Regarding disappointments, in contrast to my initial expectation as an 
outside observer, the creation of EMU did not have a signiﬁ  cant impact on further political 
uniﬁ  cation in Europe. The catalytic role of the euro, not just in ﬁ  nancial markets but also in 
the political sphere, was something that I expected to gain some stronger momentum in the 
ﬁ  rst ten years. Looking back, it hasn’t.”350        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
process may take decades and will almost certainly be less rapid than in a 
period of speedier progress toward political union.35
9.5    The  Challenges  Ahead
Over the next decade, the ECB will face many of the policy challenges 
common to all major central banks. From time to time, we expect that it will: 
(a) reassess and reﬁ  ne the strategy employed to secure its treaty-  mandated 
objectives; (b) improve its models of the euro area economy, taking account 
of structural changes induced by the integration of Europe and by trends 
such as global economic and ﬁ  nancial integration; (c) advance the frontiers 
of research and central bank practice to understand how asset prices and 
other ﬁ  nancial developments should be integrated into policy decisions; 
(d) regularly reassess the outlook for price developments and recalibrate its 
policy stance consistent with its objectives and strategy; (e) manage liquidity 
as a lender of last resort when crisis threatens; (f) communicate its under-
standing and its policy thrust to the public at large to foster accountability 
and make policy eﬀective; and (g) cooperate with policymakers outside the 
euro area to address issues of mutual interest, ranging from ﬁ  nancial stabil-
ity to exchange rate developments to the operation of oﬃcial international 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. These issues are of great interest, and the ECB 
likely will make important contributions to global “best practice,” while also 
beneﬁ  ting from the successes of other central banks.
In the remainder of this chapter we focus on challenges for the ECB that 
diﬀer substantively from those facing other major central banks. The con-
cerns identiﬁ  ed by our interviewees as likely to pose special challenges for 
the ECB exhibit some variation, but two stand out: (a) enlargement, and 
(b) the complex framework for addressing ﬁ  nancial instability. A variety of 
other matters received attention, but less broadly. These include the need to 
develop and secure a popular basis for the ECB, the need to manage a low-
  growth region facing competitiveness challenges and regional divergences, 
diﬃculties of ﬁ  scal coordination, and potential conﬂ  ict over currency mat-
ters with ECOFIN, among others. We address each of these in turn.
9.5.1    Enlargement
Jean- Claude Trichet: “We are 27 countries in the European Union. In the 
euro area, we are 15. Of the 27, 25 have no opt-  out clause. The challenge 
is to progressively absorb all the newcomers: none of them has an opt-
  out clause. At the same time it is imperative to preserve the credibility of 
the euro area as a whole by strictly respecting the conditions of entry, the 
Maastricht criterion.”
35. Philipp Hildebrand: “[T]he big challenge for the ECB remains that it does not have a 
natural (or national) constituency in the population.”The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 5 1
Otmar Issing: “It was extremely important to have an automatic rule 
which determines who will vote when. That rotation rule is in place and 
can be applied when the number of members reaches 21. Discussion rules 
can be changed anytime. New people will ﬁ  nd reasonable solutions.”
Lucas Papademos: “As the euro area expands and the number of Govern-
ing Council members increases, it may be more eﬃcient to take decisions 
by voting rather than by forging a consensus as is presently the case.”
Enlargement will aﬀect the euro area and the ECB in many ways. By 
virtually any metric, it will add to the region’s diversity (whether the focus 
is on language, culture, or legal systems). From an economic perspective, 
a twenty-  ﬁ  ve-  country currency area will form the world’s largest in terms 
of GDP, with a population of about 500 million, compared to around 300 
million in the United States. The ratio of per capita incomes between the 
richest and poorest members would widen to nearly 13 from less than 4, 
based on recent data (see ﬁ  gure 9.10).36 The speed of integration of product, 
labor, and ﬁ  nancial markets may quicken, accelerating structural change. 
And each new euro area member will bring with it a new ﬁ  scal agent and 
a parliament. Among other things, this expansion will increase incentives 
for free- riding, thereby complicating any constitutional changes that would 
require unanimity.
Naturally, the need to assess the preparedness of prospective members will 
repeatedly revive the issues that confronted the European Council ahead of 
EMU: What degree of convergence has been achieved, and what is needed 
to satisfy the treaty’s provisions? Although we did not explicitly pose this 
question, our interviewees reported no reason to expect that convergence 
prerequisites would be relaxed in the future.
Against this background, the ECB has established a set of voting rules—
essentially a rotation structure for NCB governors that resembles the voting 
practices of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee. In this sense, the 
ECB is well ahead of other political structures in the European Union—
including the European Council and the ECOFIN—that also may experi-
ence stress as their membership becomes larger and more diverse.
Nevertheless, in the absence of further reforms, enlargement threatens to 
make the ECB less nimble.37 The large number of voting parties (capped at 
twenty-  one in December 2002), and the larger number of potential discus-
sants in the Governing Council (which includes nonvoting Governors), will 
tend to complicate decision making. If increased membership makes policy 
debates interminable, it may not take long for the Governing Council to 
36. This calculation excludes Luxembourg, which has the euro area’s highest income per 
capita.
37. Philipp Hildebrand: “Making the institution function well as it enlarges will be a very big 
challenge. As the membership increases, at some point, there will be an inevitable need to look 
at institutional reform to make sure the organization can remain nimble and eﬀective.”352        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
adopt mechanisms for speeding discussion. Over time, eﬃciency consid-
erations likely will boost pressures to shift from a “consensus” model to a 
voting model for making policy choices.38
The committee process, which still requires Frankfurt visits by NCB staﬀ 
to achieve consensus and make decisions outside of the narrow arena of 
policy rate determination, poses a greater challenge. Innovative approaches 
that delegate authority (or monitoring responsibilities) to subgroups that 
do not include all twenty-  ﬁ  ve national representatives may become more 
frequent. One past example of such cooperation has been the development 
of TARGET II undertaken by a subset of NCBs and then distributed to the 
euro system as a whole.
Yet it remains to be seen whether an increasingly diverse membership will 
be prepared to delegate authority across a broader set of tasks. How will the 
enlarged membership aﬀect the consensus on issues such as the quantitative 
deﬁ  nition of price stability or on the policy strategy? How will ECB deci-
sion practices evolve? How will membership of the Executive Board evolve 
to reﬂ  ect enlargement? Will it become more diﬃcult to reach consensus on 
the appointments of top ECB oﬃcials? Will trends toward economic diver-
gence for some existing euro area members intensify or diminish as mem-
bership rises? How will the diﬃculty of coordination among twenty-  ﬁ  ve 
ﬁ  scal agents aﬀect monetary policy? Will a larger number of more diverse 
Fig. 9.10    European union: Per capita income by country (euro area average  
100), 2007
Source: IMF.
38. The possibility of a future shift toward a voting model was mentioned by more than 
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members exposed to idiosyncratic shocks raise the chances of a national 
ﬁ  scal crisis, widen market yield spreads, and, in the extreme, lead to a test 
of the Maastricht treaty’s “no-  bailout” provisions?
Enlargement will be a particular challenge in the area of communication. 
Even today, no other central bank faces the task of communicating with 
the public at large in ﬁ  fteen diﬀerent countries. While the presence of NCB 
governors at the ECB is helpful, it is far from a panacea. As our interviewees 
observed, speaking to local governments or populations is fundamentally 
diﬀerent than communicating with ﬁ  nancial markets. As we noted earlier, the 
lack of synchronization in this eﬀort in the early years of the ECB may have 
created market confusion on occasion. Regardless of their current cyclical 
circumstances, diverse national histories may prompt diﬀerent constituen-
cies to view identical policy statements as accommodative or restrictive. If 
the longest-  run challenge of the ECB is to secure a popular base, as several 
interviewees suggest, then enlargement only intensiﬁ  es that challenge.39
Against this background, we do not expect the ECB to publish minutes, 
detail the statements or votes of Council members, or announce an expected 
policy rate path anytime soon. However, policymakers may choose to con-
sider other means of reporting on policy-  related discussions that better 
reveal the range of Council views without inviting invidious political attacks 
against individuals. For example, information about the evolving strength 
or weakness of the policy consensus could aﬀect forward-  looking ﬁ  nancial 
markets in a fashion that would enhance the eﬀectiveness of policy.
Of course, the EU itself may expand beyond its current membership of 
twenty-  seven. We expect that new entrants to the EU will wish to join the 
euro area at an early stage to secure the beneﬁ  ts of its credibility. Conse-
quently, the enlargement challenge is both unique and open-  ended.
9.5.2    Financial  Stability
Jaime Caruana, “When I was going to Frankfurt as a central banker, my 
role was clear. I had to vote for the best monetary policy for the euro zone. 
When I participated in ﬁ  nancial stability discussions, my role was clear: 
as the Spanish banking supervisor, my mandate in the Spanish law was 
to defend the Spanish banking system. I was accountable to the Span-
ish Parliament. Fortunately, protecting the Spanish banking system was 
consistent with protecting the European one, but I think that introducing 
some balance, some European mandate would be better.”
39. Beyond enlargement per se, several interviewees expressed concern that politicians and 
the public at large would forget how diﬃcult life was before monetary union. Ignazio Angeloni: 
“Over time, I think that people will start forgetting the beneﬁ  ts and the advantages of belonging 
to the euro. They will forget how diﬃcult it was to manage their own currencies. I am talking 
about particularly those that had unstable exchange rates. They will forget the times of high 
interest rates due to currency challenges. And they will start thinking that perhaps without the 
euro they can be better oﬀ. Unavoidably, I think there will be political elements in national 
politics that will try to exploit anti-  euro public opinion sentiments.”354        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
Christian Noyer: “We need to have the same rules. Even if we had a single 
supervision authority, it would not solve the problem simply because 
there are diﬀerences in the regulations. The single authority would have 
to implement 15 diﬀerent legislations of regulation. Unifying the rules is 
certainly the ﬁ  rst thing to do.”
Axel Weber: “We need an evolving European structure of banking super-
vision. When the banks become more international, more pan- European, 
so will banking supervision. This is an evolution that will become more 
important in the future.”
Jean-  Claude Trichet: “At this stage, what we are calling for is a close 
relationship—intimate cooperation between the banking surveillance 
authorities themselves, and very close links with the central bank, includ-
ing a full transfer of information.”
Our questionnaire (drafted in the spring of 2007) highlights concerns 
about the euro area’s framework for ﬁ  nancial stability that predated the 
global crisis that began in August 2007. At this writing, that crisis is test-
ing the industrial world’s stability apparatus more broadly, intensively, and 
persistently than any prior experience in the postwar period, and certainly 
far beyond what any simulation or diagnostic stress test likely would achieve. 
As a result, the crisis has revealed important strengths of the euro area sta-
bility mechanisms, but has not reduced our unease about vulnerabilities in 
this framework.
Because these concerns are largely shared by our interviewees, we are 
conﬁ  dent that the ECB will seek aggressively to approach “best practice” 
in this area, as it has in other matters. However, continued progress toward 
ﬁ  nancial integration, in the context of a fragmented and complex stability 
framework, probably makes this goal the most important as well as the most 
diﬃcult one for the ECB over the next decade. Failure to advance the stabil-
ity framework—which is a task that goes far beyond the limits of what the 
ECB alone can achieve—could involve large costs for the region as a whole 
and could reduce the competitiveness of euro area ﬁ  nancial centers.
In the area of liquidity provision as a lender of last resort, recent experi-
ence has highlighted important ECB successes. In August 2007, the ECB 
boosted liquidity supply early and aggressively to counter sharp increases 
in funding rates as banks turned cautious and alternative private sources 
of funding shut down. The ECB’s Bagehot-  style marginal lending facility 
(MLF, designed to cap overnight rates in normal times) can be viewed as 
an automatic mechanism for calming liquidity fears in a crisis.40 In order 
40. Vitor Gaspar: “If you look at the functioning of the ECB’s marginal lending facility 
and you compare with the prescriptions from Bagehot on the functioning of the lender of last 
resort, there should be no need for any ambiguity concerning the lender of last resort function. 
The lender of last resort is simply subsumed within the regular functioning of the operational 
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to deliver liquidity eﬀectively, the ECB utilized the broad ﬂ  exibility that it 
enjoys with respect to assets that it may accept as collateral or acquire out-
right, including a variety of asset-  backed securities.41 Beginning in Decem-
ber 2007, the ECB also cooperated with other central banks, including play-
ing a role in distributing dollar liquidity to banks in its region.
As term euro rates surged, the ECB was compelled to engage in ﬁ  ne- 
tuning operations that supplied an extraordinary volume of liquidity, sug-
gesting that intermediaries became reluctant in the crisis to use the anony-
mous MLF. The ECB’s actions also did not prevent term money market 
spreads from widening in a persistent fashion once the crisis began in ear-
nest. Unlike the Swiss National Bank, for example, the ECB did not alter 
its overnight rate target to stabilize term money market rates. The eﬀect has 
been a tightening of money market conditions that policymakers did not 
explicitly seek.
Yet the ECB could have avoided this outcome (by lowering policy rates) 
if it had wished to do so. The ECB’s willingness to tolerate a rise in term 
money market rates (and to consider increasing the key rate on repurchase 
agreements) highlights the extent to which it has distinguished between the 
provision of crisis liquidity and the setting of policy rates. Moral hazard 
concerns still would arise if the ECB appears compelled to compensate for 
uncertainty about systemic vulnerabilities by generous liquidity provision. 
Even so, it seems fair to conclude that the ECB’s tool kit for liquidity supply 
has been crisis-  tested and satisﬁ  es current “best practice” standards among 
central banks.
At the same time, other, potentially more troubling aspects of the euro 
area stability framework have been brought to light in this episode.42 In 
contrast to liquidity matters—which lie clearly within the ECB’s mandate—
solvency matters are addressed exclusively by national institutions, which 
may have diﬀerent views about what constitutes a systemic threat and about 
how and when public resources should be employed.43 The fact that there is 
no euro area ﬁ  scal agent means that burden-  sharing across nations would 
be a challenge should a large (truly European, rather than national) institu-
tion become unstable. In many, but not all, euro area countries, the NCB 
is the banking supervisor, but few NCBs also supervise nonbank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions or securities markets.44 Rules for supervision are made at the 
country level, and have not been fully aligned across the euro area despite 
41. See European Central Bank (2006a) for a description of collateral rules. We note that the 
Federal Reserve’s liquidity-  supply mechanisms have evolved during the crisis to become more 
like the ECB’s both in terms of acceptable collateral and the range of counterparties.
42. For a view that regulatory competition contributed to recent ﬁ  nancial excesses, see Tabel-
lini (2008).
43. Several interviewees expressed concern about the diﬃculty in identifying insolvency.
44. It also remains to be seen how the ECB and an NCB, which implements any lending to 
speciﬁ  c institutions, would balance the needs for overall monetary control and for liquidity 
supply to a troubled institution should its requirements be large.356        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
the existence of some common ﬁ  nancial directives. It is even conceivable that 
conﬂ  icts could arise between the national mandates of some NCB governors 
in their role as supervisors and the mandate imposed by the Maastricht 
treaty in their role as members of the ECB Governing Council.45
As our interviewees stressed, there is little or no political will to replace 
this fractured supervision and crisis management framework with a more 
centralized one. In fact, it is not even clear that the presence of a single 
supervisor would successfully resolve the time-  sensitive information and 
coordination problems that are inherent in ﬁ  nancial crises.46 At present, 
even the largest ﬁ  nancial institutions typically still have an identiﬁ  able na-
tional home, while mid-  sized and small institutions usually operate locally 
and can be monitored by an expert familiar with local conditions and tradi-
tions. Finally, no supervisor anywhere has the means to address the costs 
of insolvency.47
Against this background, many interviewees favored a gradual, long- term 
shift toward greater supranational supervision, particularly as ﬁ  nancial 
integration advances. However, there was a strong practical consensus that, 
for the foreseeable future, the ECB should aim to help the existing highly 
decentralized system become suﬃciently eﬀective so that it can act as one 
in a crisis.
Crisis management in a decentralized system is a daunting challenge that 
will require the cooperation and support of many policymakers—including 
legislatures—to limit the potential damage to the euro area from a ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis. In this context, the ECB has sought to cooperate closely with 
European supervisors to ensure the timely ﬂ  ow of information to decision 
makers in a crisis.48 Even when the supervisory function is performed by an 
NCB—directly ensuring the euro system’s involvement—the timely ﬂ  ow of 
information necessitates a well-  deﬁ  ned set of procedures and practices that 
are understood in advance. For example, the central bank’s reputation could 
45. In the recent crisis, there was one potential institutional risk that reportedly was conveyed 
to the ECB only after the risk had subsided and shortly before it became public.
46. While there was substantial disagreement among the interviewees over the desirability of 
a pan-  European regulator, even those in favor of consolidation expressed doubts that such an 
institution would come into existence anytime soon. Several respondents did suggest a certain 
inevitability in the process. Jaime Caruana: “I stated publicly when I was [at the Bank of Spain] 
that either we would ﬁ  nd a system that works like a one-  regulator system in Europe, or we will 
end up having one regulator in Europe.”
47. Fabrizio Saccomanni “There is obviously great concern by political leaders that they may 
be confronted with a ‘European’ ﬁ  nancial crisis of which they know nothing and for which 
they might be required to bear a ﬁ  nancial burden that would involve taxpayer money.” Andrew 
Crockett: “It is not clear what would happen in the event that a substantial-  sized European 
ﬁ  nancial institution got into life-  threatening trouble.” Jean-  Claude Trichet. “There is no tax-
payer money at the level of Europe as a whole.”
48. Alexandre Lamfalussy: “In crisis management situations, the ﬂ  ow of information is 
extraordinarily important and there is a natural tendency of each group who possess informa-
tion to hold it back as long as feasible. That’s instinct: Hand it over only when necessary. This 
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be put at risk if an insolvent institution were able to exploit the marginal 
lending facility (even temporarily) because the ECB lacked knowledge of 
the circumstances.
In recent years, the ECB has helped prepare for episodes of ﬁ  nancial insta-
bility by promoting cooperation among supervisors and the central bank.49 
The Committee of Bank Supervisors, which meets at the ECB, is one ex-
ample. The ECB also has been a party to Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs) with supervisors and ﬁ  scal agents that promote cooperative behav-
ior and help clarify responsibilities in a crisis. Also, the ECB has cooperated 
with supervisors in simulation exercises or stress tests to prepare oﬃcials for 
a crisis. Going forward, the ECB can seek to promote a uniﬁ  ed, best-  practice 
approach among supervisors in collecting and assessing information about 
the institutions under their purview. Such a common methodology—akin 
to the guidelines and materials developed by the Federal Reserve for the 
supervisors in its District Banks—would appear to be a prerequisite for 
eﬃcient information ﬂ  ow in a crisis.50
The ECB, like any lender of last resort, has to be concerned lest its prepa-
rations and plans for addressing crises prompt moral hazard. Even so, some 
interviewees thought that the complexity and decentralization of the stabil-
ity framework favored the development of a “handbook” for crisis response, 
combined with clarity about the chain of command in a crisis. Agreement on 
such a structure would require the mutual assent of many parties, because it 
is not set in law as a euro area standard. Without it, however, policymakers 
may not know who is in charge. Moreover, the lack of accountability would 
diminish the incentives to manage eﬀectively. The task of balancing such 
preparations and crisis ﬂ  exibility against moral hazard risks is diﬃcult even 
where the crisis chain of command is clear, but seems even greater where it 
is not.
Managing a future crisis also could be complicated by diﬀering national 
legal mechanisms and procedures. For example, euro area members have 
diﬀerent practices with regard to deposit insurance, bankruptcy, and even 
court procedures. There also is no common approach for early public inter-
vention in the case of a troubled ﬁ  nancial institution, such as the procedures 
for “prompt corrective action” in the United States or the proposed “spe-
cial resolution regime” in the United Kingdom.51 A credible threat of early 
intervention creates incentives for ﬁ  nancial institutions to guard their capital 
and thereby limits systemic risks. Early intervention rules also could reduce 
49. See the relevant articles in the ECB Bulletin (2004b and 2007a).
50. In a recent assessment of the ﬁ  nancial stability framework, the euro system concludes 
that “supervisory convergence is a key objective.” See ECB (2007b).
51. For details of the United Kingdom’s proposed special resolution regime, see Bank of 
England, HM Treasury, and Financial Services Authority (2008). When asked whether an early 
intervention scheme was needed in the euro area, Jaime Caruana responded that there is a clear 
need for “some kind of early intervention system where the rules are clear and you know that 
you have to act rapidly at the beginning.”358        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
“home-  host” strains that may arise when banks compete in other national 
markets by narrowing the uncertainty of host supervisors about the workout 
procedures and the availability of capital in a crisis. As U.K. policymakers 
learned from the Northern Rock episode, the lack of an early intervention 
mechanism can leave policymakers with a painful choice between acquiesc-
ing to heightened systemic threats from a bank run or to moral hazard-
  inducing bailouts of shareholders, debt holders, and management.
Naturally, enlargement will add to the complexity of the euro area stabil-
ity framework. Accordingly, the ECB also may wish to encourage prospec-
tive new members to implement best-  practice rules and procedures in this 
area as they prepare for accession to the single currency.
9.5.3    Other  Distinguishing  Challenges
Otmar Issing: “What is unique for the ECB is the complex environment. 
For any central bank, be it the Bundesbank, Banque de France, or the 
Federal Reserve, the support of the people is crucial. But, the ECB still 
is a young institution, and the euro area is very complex, not least due to 
the language and communication problem.
Sirkka Hämäläinen: “There are many signs of weaker political commit-
ment: unwillingness to meet the commitments of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, attacks on the independence of the ECB, or the lack of measures for 
structural improvements. Monetary policy needs strong political support 
to be eﬀective.”
Enlargement and ﬁ  nancial stability are not the only issues that are likely 
to aﬀect the ECB diﬀerently over the coming decade. The list of unique 
challenges identiﬁ  ed by our interviewees is substantial, and includes popular 
attitudes toward the central bank, potential for regional divergences in a 
low-  growth region, coordination with ﬁ  scal agents, response to currency 
disturbances, personnel selection, and operational eﬃciency. In this section 
we brieﬂ  y discuss a few of these.
Broadening the Popular Base
Before the Maastricht treaty was enacted, critics sometimes spoke of a 
“democratic deﬁ  cit” to describe a perceived lack of grassroots support for 
and involvement in the political (and monetary) integration that European 
leaders sought to realize. This legacy, combined with the complexity of euro 
area and European governance, boosts the importance of ECB transpar-
ency and accountability. Over the long term, no central bank can operate 
in a truly independent fashion without a modicum of popular support for 
its objectives and methods. In the case of the ECB, the broader the popular 
support, the more its policies are likely to appear credible and resilient (and, 
as a consequence, prove eﬀective).
As previously highlighted, the ECB uses many means to address its diverse 
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mother of invention, the ECB is likely to be at the forefront in improving cen-
tral bank communications, because the challenges that it faces are notably 
greater and more enduring than at other central banks. As our interviewees 
emphasized, communication in multiple languages and across cultures and 
traditions is inherently complex, and will become increasingly so as the euro 
area enlarges. Some national politicians also may view the ECB as an easy 
target, because it lacks a national constituency that would raise the political 
costs of ECB-  bashing.52 At some stage, eﬀective ECB policy will conﬂ  ict 
with the short-  term interests of particular countries or their policymakers. 
Reduced momentum toward political integration in Europe also exposes the 
ECB to potential backlash against policy centralization, even when changes 
in the economic environment—such as increased ﬁ  nancial integration—
favor coordinated responses.53
Suboptimal Currency Area
Critics of the Maastricht treaty bemoaned the lack of European ﬁ  scal and 
labor market ﬂ  exibility long before the ECB was established. If anything, the 
track record of EMU’s ﬁ  rst decade has resulted in less economic and ﬁ  scal 
divergence than many observers, including some interviewees, had feared. 
However, risks remain because potential growth is low, labor markets are 
relatively rigid, and there is little scope for ﬁ  scal burden- sharing. Moreover, 
as Papademos (2007) describes, some countries—including Greece, Italy, 
and Portugal—exhibit divergent trends in the growth of unit labor costs that 
appear to diminish their competitiveness. Widening current account imbal-
ances are a symptom of this competitiveness problem (see ﬁ  gure 9.9).
The ECB cannot alter its policy rate for the purpose of limiting economic 
divergence or to boost growth sustainably above potential. Nevertheless, 
both divergence and low potential growth add to the strains associated with 
stability-  oriented monetary policy, making ECB policies less popular and 
less credible.54 In the extreme, economic divergences can prompt a regional 
ﬁ  scal crisis that might test untried portions of the Maastricht treaty, such 
as the “no bailout” clause. While such a test currently seems a remote pos-
sibility, it cannot be ruled out over the long run.
Coordination with Fiscal Agents
In the ﬁ  rst decade of EMU, contrary to pessimistic expectations, there 
were no ﬁ  scal crises, and the excessive deﬁ  cit procedures that began in reces-
52. Philipp Hildebrand: “Politicians face a relatively low cost for attacking the ECB com-
pared to the cost they would face in attacking a similarly credible national central bank.”
53. Axel Weber: “I think politicians very often forget the merits and the advantages of having 
independent central banks guaranteeing price stability and have not lived in periods where they 
see the downside eﬀects of high inﬂ  ation on the economy.”
54. Ignazio Angeloni: “If [cyclical and inﬂ  ation] divergence persists, it could present prob-
lems. I regard these potentially as political risks, political strains.”360        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
sion mostly have been wound down as deﬁ  cits narrowed cyclically. However, 
the willingness of ﬁ  scal policymakers to relax the Stability and Growth Pact 
strongly hints at ﬁ  scal fatigue. Despite some consolidation, three countries 
(Belgium, Greece, and Italy) still have gross general government debt ratios 
in excess of 80 percent of GDP. More importantly, oﬃcials have expressed 
concern about the threat of ﬁ  scal unsustainability in some countries as the 
euro area population ages.55
At this stage, there remains little reason to predict an acute challenge, 
but it is not diﬃcult to imagine circumstances in which diﬃculties might 
arise. For example, the threat of a debt deﬂ  ation could place an excessive 
burden on monetary policy to secure price stability without coordinated 
ﬁ  scal support. Achieving coordination among ﬁ  fteen or more ﬁ  scal deci-
sion makers (or even among a handful of large-  country decision makers) 
makes the ECB’s potential challenge more complex than that of other major 
central banks.56
We view the likelihood of a sustained, open conﬂ  ict between monetary 
and aggregate ﬁ  scal policy as remote. As Sargent and Wallace (1981) 
famously showed a quarter of a century ago, such a conﬂ  ict can undermine 
the inﬂ  ation credibility even of a resolute central bank. Fortunately, there is 
little reason to anticipate such a clash. For example, recent Eurobarometer 
polls suggest that when inﬂ  ation rises, popular awareness helps underpin 
the ECB’s objective of price stability.57 And despite evidence of ﬁ  scal fatigue 
over the past decade, peer pressure among ﬁ  scal policymakers has helped to 
limit the kind of post-  EMU ﬁ  scal slippage that many skeptics anticipated.
Against the background of diverging competitiveness, a somewhat more 
likely (if still highly improbable) scenario would be a rise of market distur-
bances caused by the loss of conﬁ  dence in a (group of) ﬁ  scal agent(s). Would 
such a ﬁ  scal crisis also threaten the stability of the regional ﬁ  nancial system 
(say, by weakening institutional balance sheets and the credibility of na-
tional deposit insurance schemes)? The notable decline of home country bias 
in euro area debt after EMU almost surely has reduced “concentration risk” 
in the ﬁ  nancial system (see Issing 2006a). Nevertheless, no central bank can 
aﬀord to ignore the potential linkages between ﬁ  scal and ﬁ  nancial instabil-
ity. Consequently, it would be surprising if the ECB became less inclined to 
advocate ﬁ  scal prudence as it seeks to secure price stability.
55. Of current EMU members, a recent European Commission report (2007) that addresses 
ﬁ  scal sustainability and aging populations cited Greece and Portugal as “high- risk” cases. Only 
Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands were “low risk.”
56. Timothy Geithner: “They never resolved fundamentally what was going to be the frame-
work of discipline on the ﬁ  scal side.”
57. Asked to name the two most important issues facing their country, the share of persons 
in the euro area identifying rising prices or inﬂ  ation jumped to 26 percent in the autumn of 
2007 (making it the second item on the list), up from 16 percent a year earlier (and a 16 percent 
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Exchange Rate Considerations
The euro depreciated considerably in the early years of EMU. However, 
the ECB has never faced an exchange rate crisis similar to the one in the 
United States in the late 1970s: (a) a plunging currency; (b) rising inﬂ  a-
tion expectations; and (c) sharply weakening long-  term ﬁ  nancial markets. 
This may reﬂ  ect another dividend of the ECB’s anti- inﬂ  ationary credibility. 
However, over the next decade, it is easy to imagine the combination of a 
continued unwinding of the large current account imbalances that have 
characterized the global economy over the past decade and an upward reval-
uation of currencies in some large emerging economies. Discontinuities in 
this process could test the ECB’s ability to work cooperatively with other 
central banks to limit disturbances in other ﬁ  nancial markets and (thereby) 
to secure economic and price stability.
The key issues for the euro area will be to clarify who decides currency 
policy and what circumstances, if any, merit currency intervention. The 
ECB’s track record now provides considerable conﬁ  dence that these issues 
will be addressed successfully in the future. But the Maastricht treaty’s allo-
cation of authority for setting the currency regime to ﬁ  nance ministers leaves 
lingering uncertainties.
Other Matters
We close by mentioning without elaboration three additional challenges 
that surfaced in our interviews. First, some interviewees pointed to the loss 
of political will toward European integration as a potential source of added 
complexity in matters ranging from enlargement to ﬁ  nancial stabilization. 
Second, there was concern that the generational turnover of leadership at 
the ECB in coming years will focus attention not only on the competence 
and diversity of new Executive Board members (and senior staﬀ), but also 
on the potential for rigidities with respect to country representation. While 
the treaty’s mandate for ECB autonomy is very powerful, turnover also 
creates a risk that politicians least supportive of the ECB would promote 
candidates less zealously independent. Third, there was the hope that the 
pace of progress toward operational eﬃciency will reveal the ECB’s ability 
to overcome national resistance to productivity-  enhancing consolidation 
(e.g., in reducing the large number of physical mints).
9.6    Conclusions
John Taylor: “The biggest success has been to set it up from scratch, to 
deal with the inherent diﬃculties of communication and diﬀerent tradi-
tions, and to have a policy apparatus which is basically working well in 
terms of interest rate decisions, et cetera. That has to be viewed as a major 
achievement. It’s the ﬁ  rst time anything like that has been done.”362        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
Philipp Hildebrand: “I sometimes have the impression that the ECB has 
more credibility than it gives itself credit for.”
In reﬂ  ecting on the ﬁ  rst decade of European Monetary Union we are 
reminded of the story of the Vasa, the Swedish warship to which a museum 
is devoted in Stockholm.58 In an eﬀort to build a symbol of Sweden’s bur-
geoning naval power, King Gustavus II Adolphus ordered the construction 
of a large and elaborate ship. No expense was spared. To accommodate the 
seventy- two cannons cast for it, the Vasa was built with two gun decks rather 
than the usual one. The result was a massive, top-  heavy, and unstable ship 
that the King nevertheless ordered to set sail on August 10, 1628. The Vasa 
sank almost immediately after encountering its ﬁ  rst stiﬀ breeze less than two 
kilometers from port.
There are two morals to the story of the Vasa. First, governments occa-
sionally arrange large, prestigious projects that fail infamously. And second, 
experts do not like to convey bad news to kings or ministers about their pet 
projects. In the ECB’s case, the Maastricht treaty ventured where no vessel 
had gone before, but it has worked well. That success presumably is owed to 
the design and the crew, not to the lack of turbulence.
Our ECB interviewees rightly express pride and satisfaction in their ac-
complishment. Literally thousands of people worked diligently for years to 
make monetary union not only a reality, but a success. It is diﬃcult to ﬁ  nd 
major fault with the operational framework or the monetary policy deci-
sions of the ﬁ  rst decade of EMU.
Indeed, with the broader perspective of time, many of the criticisms that 
have been addressed at the ECB appear ancillary in light of the euro area’s 
track record of low and stable inﬂ  ation and reasonably stable economic 
growth. The ECB focused eﬀectively on price stability, while maintaining 
its treaty-  mandated independence. Critics acknowledge that the two-  pillar 
strategy did not prompt the ECB to become overly restrictive for any sus-
tained period, despite persistent overshoots of the monetary reference value. 
And it is doubtful that ECB goal asymmetry is prompting a sustained rise 
of long-  term inﬂ  ation expectations, as some observers anticipated.
Naturally, policy strategy, implementation, and communication should 
be routinely reviewed, and there is always room for improvement. Some 
outside observers have suggested that the ECB missed a key opportunity 
in 2003 to make greater progress toward best practice. Our own view is 
that the ECB leadership has demonstrated an open attitude to proposals 
for reform—including recommendations in the areas of strategy and com-
munications—provided that the proposals adequately reﬂ  ect the complex 
political constraints under which the ECB operates.
Ultimately, with successes come new challenges. For the euro system, our 
58. For details of the Vasa’s history and the museum, see http:/  /  www.vasamuseet.se/ 
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interviewees highlighted two: enlargement and ﬁ  nancial stability. On the 
ﬁ  rst, we see the constant addition of new countries as a tremendous chal-
lenge for both communication and policy setting itself. As the euro area 
expands, the addition of new constituencies that speak diﬀerent languages 
and have diﬀerent customs and histories will complicate communication 
further. In addition, the more countries there are, the more likely that real 
divergence at the national level will arise. Also, dramatically diﬀerent pro-
ductivity and labor market performance would place substantial stress on 
monetary union.
Once everything is said and done, the issue of ﬁ  nancial stability seems 
paramount to us. The key problem is one of information and coordina-
tion during a crisis, as well as harmonization of procedures. It is extremely 
unlikely that Europe will create a supranational supervisory authority to 
complement the ECB in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such a new 
organizational structure the majority of interviewees anticipated that the 
current one would need to work as if it were a single entity.
Returning to the accomplishments of the ﬁ  rst decade of monetary union, 
our interviewees were unanimous in their conclusion that the ECB has many 
more successes than disappointments to its credit. We agree.
Appendix A
Questionnaire
The following questionnaire was drafted in June 2007 and formed the 
basis for all of our interviews. In every case, we sent the questionnaire with 
our initial letter requesting an interview. We clearly stated in that letter that 
we would be happy to omit any question that the interviewee did not wish 
to answer. In one case, we discussed the questions with the interviewee in 
advance and agreed on some changes, which are noted in the footnotes.
I.      Policy in the First Decade of Monetary Union
a.  Thinking back to 1998, what did you anticipate would be the biggest pol-
icy challenges? Now, nearly a decade later, what do you think the biggest 
policy challenges were? How did your policy goals evolve over time?
b.  What were the ECB’s most important policy successes and disappoint-
ments?
c.  How has the decision- making process of the Governing Council evolved? 
How do the decision processes under the Duisenberg and Trichet presi-
dencies compare? Has the process been smoother or more complicated 
than initially expected?59
59. For some of the interviewees we substituted the following question: How has the decision-
  making process of the Governing Council evolved over time?”364        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
d.  On occasion, the relationship between the ECB and the political leaders 
of selected euro area countries has been strained. How have these develop-
ments aﬀected ECB policy determination?
II.      Policy in the Second Decade of Monetary Union
a.  Looking forward, what is the biggest challenge facing the euro area over 
the next decade?
b.  Are the ECB’s challenges diﬀerent from those facing a “mature” central 
bank?
c. Communication policy is a work in progress for many central banks. 
Which of the world’s central banks do you believe is at the frontier of 
best practice in communication policy? What aspects of that central 
bank’s policy would you single out as worthy of emulation elsewhere? 
How do you see the ECB’s communication policy evolving over the next 
few years?
d.  Some observers express concern about the diﬃculties facing the ECB in 
personnel matters. How does the role of nationality in personnel selection 
aﬀect conﬁ  dence in the ECB and its governance?60
III.    Financial  Stability
a.  Does the euro area face any unusual challenges in promoting ﬁ  nancial 
stability?
b.  Does the lack of direct responsibility for regulatory and supervisory mat-
ters create any obstacle for the ECB in pursuing its ﬁ  nancial stability 
objective?
c. What is the biggest challenge for policy coordination in a crisis? What 




Following is a summary of the themes that emerged from our interviews. For 
each question, we looked for similarities in the responses of the interviewees. 
Beyond that, we have used our judgment in creating the list. The following 
results should not be interpreted as implying agreement or consensus among 
the interviewees.
60. This question was omitted for some interviewees.The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 6 5
I.      Policy in the First Decade of Monetary Union
a.      Thinking Back to 1998, What Were the Challenges?
Strategy, Instruments, Communications were all open issues
Unprecedented experiment with little time to prepare
No track record (untested operational framework)
Absence of data at the outset
Uncertain transmission mechanism
Challenge of anchoring inﬂ  ation expectations and creating credibility
Potential conﬂ  ict between the ECB and the NCBs
Worries about ﬁ  scal policy and the Stability and Growth Pact
Concern that entry of many countries would destabilize EMU
Skepticism of external observers that the project would succeed
Challenge of creating a virtual currency initially
Euro area was not an optimal currency area—one size does not ﬁ  t all
Structural inﬂ  exibility in the euro area economies
Diﬃculties created by enlargement
Hindsight: Goals were stable; optimal currency area fears were overdone; 
communication challenge underestimated
b.      Important Successes and Disappointments
Successes
Rapid establishment of credibility and stable goals (mandate  legacy)
Overcame external shocks (not just luck)
Major advances in data collection and forecasting
Transparent policy strategy, especially the quantitative deﬁ  nition of price 
stability
Excellent track record: low inﬂ  ation, stable inﬂ  ation expectations, and low 
inﬂ  ation volatility
Cooperation between the ECB and the NCBs
No major errors in interest rate setting
An eﬀective decision-  making apparatus
Operational success in liquidity provision in crisis and foreign exchange 
intervention
Successfully guarded institutional independence from start
Eﬀective international cooperation
Rapid money market integration; deep bond market integration
Euro has become a leading world currency
Consolidation of European banking and ﬁ  nancial integration
2003 reform: altered communication strategy and use of policy framework
The euro yield curve was the best legacy yield curve at start366        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz




Lack of ﬁ  scal and structural reforms (thereby sustaining low potential 
growth)
Teething problems in communication strategy
Introduction of coins and notes leads to substantial perceived inﬂ  ation
Pace of ﬁ  nancial integration was not what had been hoped
Little impact on political uniﬁ  cation that some proponents hoped would 
come
Lack of understanding of ECB’s role vis-  à-  vis national governments, the 
NCBs, and the European Commission
Inﬂ  ation sometimes above 2 percent
Lack of a framework for ﬁ  nancial stability
Some signs of divergence
c.      Has the Decision-  Making Process Evolved?
No major changes in decision-  making process
Eﬀective decision-  making apparatus, including the role of the staﬀ
Proposal power of Chief Economist at the start
No national arguments on monetary policy
Early consensus on the policy strategy
Eclectic, careful vetting of policy
Consensus does not mean unanimity
Evidence of rapid decisions in crises
EMI prep aided consensus
Evolution of the communication style
Less eﬀective cooperation on banking and national economic policy
Infrastructure decisions more problematic
d.      Have Politicians Had an Impact?
Little or no impact of pressure on decisions
Successfully established and maintained institutional independence
Easy to resist pressure from one country
Treaty protects ECB well
Political debate reﬂ  ects traditional diﬀerences
Political inﬂ  uences can cause volatility and confusion
Pressures arise from lack of popular support for ECB
ECB as a cheap targetThe First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 6 7
II.      Policy in the Second Decade of Monetary Union
a.      What are Biggest Challenges Looking Forward?
Maintaining popular support
Multi- national  communications
Enlargement (the agreed upon voting system will help)
Maintain price stability in a credible regime
Financial stability
Real divergence
Fiscal and structural issues
Loss of political will (slow ﬁ  nancial integration)
EU growth trend (competitiveness and dynamics)
b.    Is  ECB  Mature?
Most problems similar to those of other central banks
Enlargement
Multicountry
Selection of next President and Vice President key
Transmission Mechanism still uncertain
Financial Stability
Federal System/  Multiple Fiscal Agents
Issues outside conventional monetary policy
c.      Is There Best Practice in Communication?
No “one size ﬁ  ts all”
Communication policy is by its nature evolutionary
ECB transparency and accountability are high; there is no need for major 
change
Communication is necessarily shaped by history, language, diverse con-
stituency
More talk does not mean more transparency
Two pillars aided at start, but for how long?
Successes: quantitative deﬁ  nition of price stability
Press conference as substitute for minutes
Not publishing votes promotes “euro area” thinking
Would an inﬂ  ation target be clearer?
Enlargement adds to communication challenge
Naïve to cite small-  country central bank strategy as a model for ECB
d.      Nationality of the Board?
Nationality irrelevant for staﬃng
High standard of personnel achieved368        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
Favorable comparison to other international organizations
Nationality of Executive Board members is key; need wider rotation
What happens if United Kingdom enters?
III.    Financial  Stability
a.      Unusual Challenges in Financial Stability?
Greatest contribution to ﬁ  nancial stability is continued price stability
Liquidity provision is a joint ECB/  NCB responsibility
Ex-  ante crisis management creates moral hazard
Bailouts have to be done by national governments with public funds
Financial regulatory process is in ﬂ  ux with overlapping jurisdictions in 
Europe, EU, euro area
Relationship among markets in diﬀerent countries in ﬂ  ux
Various committees and MoUs promote cooperation, but the mechanism 
is complex
Euro system Marginal Lending Facility follows the Bagehot procedures
Common collateral framework makes the Lender of Last Resort operate 
more eﬃciently
There remains the danger of perpetuating insolvency through central bank 
lending
The key to crisis management is timely information exchange
Supervision needs to evolve with ﬁ  nancial integration
Burden-  sharing challenge rises with ﬁ  nancial integration
Contrast: NCB Governor role in monetary policy versus role in ﬁ  nancial 
stability
Pragmatic approach: European Secretariat
Early intervention needed (better incentives for market plus reduction of 
home/ host  stresses)
Real test will come with a solvency crisis in a recession
Decentralization creates a challenge in distinguishing illiquidity from insol-
vency
Lack of coordination could threaten competitiveness of European ﬁ  nancial 
centers?
b.      Lack of Regulatory and Supervisory Authority
Supranational supervisor not necessary—complex coordination is a sub-
stitute
Doctrine: Close relationship between ECB and supervisory authorities
Exchange of information identiﬁ  ed as key
Requires protocols to aid information ﬂ  ow under stress
NCBs provide relationship with counterparties
There may be an evolution toward more supranational approach?The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 6 9
National mandate, culture, practices, law, hinder supervisors from working 
as one
Political resistance to European supervision
ECB can see unusual borrowing by an institution
Reforms needed not just for institutional design: Crisis handbooks, exercises
c.      Policy Coordination in Crisis?
Multiparty coordination diﬃcult
Burden-  sharing not centralized
Long evolution ahead
Greater diversity of circumstances and sophistication
Collateral regime insuﬃcient with insolvency
Euro system lacks a clear New York Fed style liquidity desk
CB as natural leader in crisis (source of liquidity)
Appendix C
Brief Biographies of Interviewees
We interviewed seventeen high-  level current and former oﬃcials, the 
majority of whom were directly involved in the creation of the monetary 
union. We sent out twenty-  two interview requests. Two were declined; two 
agreed to interviews but we were unable to schedule them; and in one case 
we received no response.
Following, we provide a very brief biographic sketch of each interviewee. 
In order to conserve space, we focus on the experience that is most relevant 
for our purposes. A complete biography of any of these people would run 
for pages. The date of the interview is in parentheses.
Dr. Ignazio Angeloni (September 13, 2007): From September 1998 to 
December 2002, Dr. Angeloni was Deputy Director General in the Direc-
torate Research at the European Central Bank. Prior to that he was at the 
Bank of Italy. At the time of the interview, Dr. Angeloni was Director for 
International Financial Relations at the Italian Treasury.
Dr. Jaime Caruana (November 1, 2007): From 2000 to 2006, Dr. Caruana 
was Governor of the Bank of Spain, during which time he also served as 
Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003 to 2006). 
Prior to joining the Bank of Spain, Dr. Caruana held various positions in the 
Spanish Treasury. At the time of the interview, Dr. Caruana was Counsel-
lor and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department at the 
International Monetary Fund.
Sir Andrew Crockett (October 30, 2007): From 1994 to 2003, Sir Andrew 
was the General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements. Prior 370        Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz
to that, he held various positions at the Bank of England. At the time of the 
interview, Sir Andrew was President of JP Morgan Chase International.
Dr. Vitor Gaspar (August 29, 2007): From September 1998 to Decem-
ber 2004, Dr. Gaspar was the Director-  General Research at the European 
Central Bank. Prior to that he was Director of the Research and Statistics 
Department of Bank of Portugal and Director of Economic Studies at the 
Portuguese Ministry of Finance. At the time of the interview, Dr. Gaspar 
was Acting Director of the Bureau of European Policy Advisors at the 
European Commission.
President Timothy F. Geithner (November 16, 2007): Since 2003, Mr. 
 Geithner has been President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
Vice Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee. He also serves as 
Chairman of the Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems. Prior 
to joining the Federal Reserve, Mr. Geithner held leading positions at the 
International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury, where he was Under 
Secretary for International Aﬀairs from 1999 to 2001.
Lord Edward George (January 9, 2008): From 1993 to 2003, Lord George 
was Governor of the Bank of England, where he worked for his entire career 
beginning in 1962. At the time of the interview, he was a member of the 
House of Lords.
Dr. Sirkka Hämäläinen (October 9, 2007): From 1998 to 2003, Dr. 
Hämäläinen was a member of the Executive Board of the European Cen-
tral Bank. From 1992 to 1998, she was Governor of the Bank of Finland.
Vice Chairman Philipp M. Hildebrand (January 28, 2008): Since 2003, 
Dr. Hildebrand has been a member of the Governing Board of the Swiss 
National Bank, and was named Vice Chairman in 2007. Prior to joining the 
Swiss National Bank, he held various positions in private ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions.
Prof. Dr. Otmar Issing (June 29, 2007): As a member of the Executive 
Board of the European Central Bank from June 1998 to May 2006 Pro-
fessor Issing was responsible for the Directorates General Economics and 
Research. From 1990 to 1998 he was a member of the Board of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank with a seat in the Central Bank Council. From 1988 to 1990 he 
was a member of the Council of Economic Experts in Germany. At the time 
of the interview, Professor Issing was President of the Center for Financial 
Studies at the University of Frankfurt.
Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy (November 6, 2007): From 1994 to 1997, 
Baron Lamfalussy was the founding President of the European Monetary 
Institute. Prior to that, he held various positions at the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, including serving as General Manager from 1985 to 1993. 
At the time of the interview, Baron Lamfalussy was Professor emeritus at 
the Catholic University of Louvain.
Governor Christian Noyer (February 27, 2008): Since 2003, Mr. Noyer 
has been Governor of the Banque de France. From 1998 to 2002, he was The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond    3 7 1
the founding Vice President of the European Central Bank. Prior to join-
ing the ECB, Mr. Noyer held leading positions at the French Treasury and 
Finance Ministry.
Vice President Lucas D. Papademos (November 15, 2007): Since 2002, Dr. 
Papademos has been Vice President of the European Central Bank. Prior 
to taking his current position, beginning in 1994, he was Governor of the 
Bank of Greece.
Dr. Fabrizio Saccomanni (November 6, 2007): Since 2006, Dr. Saccomanni 
has been Director General of the Bank of Italy. From 2003 to 2006, he was 
Vice President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Prior to that, Dr. Saccomanni held a variety of positions at the Bank of 
Italy.
Prof. John B. Taylor (January 25, 2008): Professor Taylor is the Mary and 
Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the 
Bowen H. and Janice Arthur McCoy Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institu-
tion. He has been a member of the faculty at Stanford University since 
1984. During that period, Professor Taylor also has served as a member of 
the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (1989 to 1991) and as Under 
Secretary of the Treasury for International Aﬀairs (2001 to 2005).
Prof. Dr. Hans Tietmeyer (October 9, 2007): From 1993 to 1999, Prof. 
Tietmeyer was President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. At the time of the 
interview, he was inter alia President of the European Business School, 
International University, Schloss Reichartshausen, Germany.
President Jean-  Claude Trichet (December 14, 2007): Since 2003, Mr. 
Trichet has been President of the European Central Bank. Prior to assum-
ing his current position, he was Governor of the Banque de France starting 
in 1993, Under Secretary of the Treasury starting in 1987, and Counsellor 
of the President of the Republic until 1981.
President Axel A. Weber (October 10, 2007): Professor Weber has been 
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank since April 2004. Prior to that he 
was Professor of International Economics at the University of Cologne and 
a member of the German Council of Economic Experts.
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Comment  Pervenche Berès
First of all, I would like to thank Cecchetti and Schoenholtz for their in- 
depth chapter, taking into account that among seventeen interviews, sixteen 
were conducted with central bankers. Before anything else, let me tell you 
that I share their general positive appraisal of the ﬁ  rst decade of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), and maybe especially of the last year. I welcome 
the fact that the euro has brought stability and fostered economic integration 
in the euro area, even if internal economic divergences have not diminished 
enough and productivity has not developed satisfactorily.
Reacting on their chapter, I suggest coming back on key issues to be fur-
ther explored for the discussion, especially concerning the main challenges 
ahead.
First, I would like to come back to the ECB’s operational framework. 
Together with Werner Langen, from the Economic and Monetary Commit-
tee of the European Parliament, I have drafted a report, EMU@10: The First 
Ten Years of Economic and Monetary Union and Future Challenges (Berès 
and Langen 2008), following the communication of the Commission last 
spring. The report addresses many elements of this debate; it was voted in 
ECON and November 2008 in plenary session. I will now discuss the chapter 
with elements on monetary policy that are developed in our report.
As regards the deﬁ  nition of price stability, the ECB aims at inﬂ  ation rates 
of below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium term. We consider that 
Pervenche Berès is the Chairwoman of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs 
of the European Parliament.